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 Introduction 
One of the anomalies of the long and 
inspiring jurisprudence of the European 
Convention on Human Rights has been 
its relative neglect of equality and nondiscrimination 
as important drivers of 
effective human rights protection. The 
Convention in its Preamble declares its 
source as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Yet what was truly 
revolutionary about that document was 
the fundamental emphasis it placed on 
equality in respect of all rights and 
freedoms. Equality and universality are 
inseparable dimensions of international 
human rights. But there was no such 
statement in the European Convention 
and its inclusion of the non-discrimination 
principle in Article 14, perhaps because 
the drafting of that article has operated 
so as to subordinate and marginalise 
equality.¹ 
However, over the last few years a new 
approach is emerging in which concern 
over systematic discrimination and 
exclusion is moving in from the margins 
of the Convention’s jurisprudence. The 
landmark judgments in the Nachova 
cases in particular represent a significant 
shift in the approach to Article 14 by the 
European Court of Human Rights 
(discussed below). The coming into force 
of Protocol 12, the free-standing equality 
provision in 2005, should reinforce the 
new approach. 
Mention of Protocol 12 should remind us 
that the broader human rights mission of 
the Council of Europe has played a role 
in the Court’s new responsiveness to 
discrimination and the plight of minorities. 
In particular the work of the European 
Commission on Racism and Intolerance 
in Europe (ECRI) has identified the 
restraints that the Court’s interpretation 
of Article 14 has placed on the use of 
the Convention by victims of racial 
discrimination and xenophobia. ECRI 
promoted the idea of a new Protocol on 
Equality, now Protocol 12, and has 
campaigned for its ratification by all 
states. The European Commission has 
led the most far reaching legislative 
efforts to eradicate racism in Europe, 
(Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
followed by the Racial Equality 
Directive²) which has surely influenced 
the Court.³ Against this background a crucial role has 
been played by strategic litigation supported by NGOs in 
encouraging a new determination by the European Court 
to confront racial and ethnic discrimination. A leading 
example is the litigation by the European Roma Rights 
Centre (ERRC). 
 
Article 14 jurisprudence 
The Court’s thinking on the meaning and scope of 
Article 14 was first set out in the “Belgian Linguistics” 
case in 1968. A crucial step for the potential effectiveness 
of the Article was the confirmation in that case that Article 
14 might be violated even where there was no violation of 
a substantive right, if there was discrimination involved. 
The Court gave the well-known example that Article 6 
alone does not compel States to institute a system of 
appeal courts. However there would be a violation read in 
conjunction with Article 14, if it debarred certain persons 
from these remedies without a legitimate reason while 
making them available to others in respect of the same 
type of actions.4 
The Court went on to declare that Article 14 should be 
thought of as if it were an integral part of each right and 
freedom protected under the Convention. In subsequent 
cases, however, where the Court found a violation of the 
substantive article it often ignored the claim under 
Article 14, examples including Smith and Grady and 
Lustig-Prean and Beckett.5 As Philip Leach has noted, the 
Court has found that Article 14 did not give rise to a 
separate issue, although the cases concerned an overtly 
discriminatory policy.6 It is arguable that had the Court 
taken its earlier doctrine more seriously, there might have 
been less need for the new Protocol 12. 
New approaches and the role of individual judges 
The rethinking of equality under the Convention is an 
interesting example of the influence over time of the 
dissenting or separate opinions of individual judges. 
Thus, in his separate opinion in Brannigan and McBride v. 
UK, Judge Matscher argued the non-derogable nature of 
Article 14.7 In the Ireland v. UK judgment, he had argued 
for the necessity to give broad conceptual scope to the 
wording of Article 14.8 
Judge Costa’s dissenting opinion over the Court’s narrow 
approach to Article 14 in Cyprus v. Turkey provides another 
example. He noted that the finding of one violation 
of the Convention did not release the Court “from the 
obligation to examine whether there have been others, 
save in exceptional circumstances where all the various 
complaints arise out of exactly the same set of facts”.9 
South East Turkey Cases 
In the many individual applications brought against 
Turkey from the mid-1990s over the situation in South- 
East Turkey the Court found numerous and serious 
violations, yet it applied its existing policy on Article 14 
and routinely held it unnecessary to consider also the 
claims of the Kurdish applicants to be victims of ethnic 
discrimination.10 The Court declared the allegations to be 
“unsubstantiated”, even when the applicants referred to 
the findings of UN bodies.11 
Nevertheless, the persistence in pleading Article 14 as a 
‘fundamental aspect’ of the Turkish cases did eventually 
lead some judges to respond. In one Chamber judgment 
two judges, Mularoni and Loucaides, found violations of 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 and Protocol No. 1 
on the ground of ethnic origin, arising from the deliberate 
burning down of the applicant’s home by Turkish security 
forces.12 Judge Mularoni, in three recent Turkish 
judgments delivered on the same day by the Second 
Chamber, called for a separate examination of the 
applicant’s complaint under Article 14 of the Convention 
on the basis of the sheer number of similar applications 
resulting in findings of Convention violations.13 He 
commented that the majority approach “…is tantamount 
to considering that the prohibition on discrimination in this 
type of case is not an important issue”. 
Nachova v. Bulgaria 
Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria14 has become the 
landmark decision on discrimination litigation. In earlier 
and similar cases on the treatment of Roma brought 
against Bulgaria,15 the Court failed to take up the Article 
14 issue, as in the Turkish cases.16 Apparently affected 
by Judge Bonello’s dissenting opinion in Anguelova, the 
Chamber in Nachova not only found a violation of Article 
14, read together with Article 2, but established that there 
is a procedural obligation under Article 14 to investigate 
possible racist motives in violent incidents. The Grand 
Chamber upheld this reasoning but it ‘overturned’ the 
Chamber on the question of the reversal of the burden of 
proof, from applicant to state, with respect to racist 
motivation. The authorities’ failure to carry out an effective 
investigation did not of itself justify shifting the burden of 
proof on the issue of discrimination to the government. 
The Chamber judgment in that respect was not 
convincing and the principle that the state is obliged to 
address racist motivation in any investigation remains.17 
With the new possibilities under Article 14 and expanded 
ratifications of Protocol 12, there are now more opportunities 
to tackle systematic discrimination. The breadth of 
the application of the principle of non-discrimination under 
Protocol 12 will be wide, extending the jurisdiction of the 
Court to all rights provided under domestic law and 
covering any act or omission of the public authorities. The 
Protocol also incorporates the principle that States may 
take affirmative action to promote full and effective 
equality in appropriate circumstances. Lawyers should be 
ready to identify lack of equality and non-discrimination in 
every relevant case, and put effort into pleading that 
dimension. The opportunities that exist for the future to 
strengthen the equality jurisdiction of the Convention are 
good news for minorities in Europe. 
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